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Abstract Portuguese politics and mainstream media have been resistant to the
recent spread of populism. This article examines the specific features of Portuguese
politics and media that might explain the apparent exception, and puts it to test by
analysing the prevalence of populist discourses and styles of communication in
different types of online media. The sample is composed of mediated and
unmediated messages on immigration and corruption, two issues that are commonly
present in populist discourses by both right- and left-wing political actors. Overall,
the content analysis shows that although populist discourses are not recurrent in
politics and media, social media have amplified the visibility of this kind of dis-
courses in Portugal.
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Introduction
Specific features of Portugal’s recent past and of its party system have rendered the
success of populist political actors particularly difficult. On the one hand, a diffuse,
enduring rejection of extreme right-wing ideas, parties, and movements is explained
by the burden of the past Salazar dictatorship. On the other hand, left-wing parties as
the Left Bloc (BE) and the Communist Party (PCP) have been functioning as
important aggregators of popular discontent without having become empty
ideological shells or populist parties. Particularly, PCP and the trade unions linked
to it have an important role in channelling discontent into popular demonstrations,
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thus efficiently ‘‘occupying the streets’’ and most protest spaces, which seems to be
preventing the development of other types of strong independent grassroots
movements, not directly linked to existing political parties.
Does this mean that we cannot find populist political discourses and commu-
nication in Portugal? Is the weight of contextual factors too overpowering to allow
the emergence of populism in political discussions on issues? By looking at the
specific characteristics of Portugal’s political and media systems, this article
advances the contextual factors that limit the success of populist political actors in
Portugal. Given that mainstream media have also been resistant to populist actors,
this research then examines the prevalence of elements of populist discourse in
different online environments, including in the online presence of mainstream
media.
Preliminary research suggests that different political actors have been using
online and social media as vehicles of less-institutionalized, direct communication
(e.g. Groshek and Engelbert 2013; Nixon et al. 2015) and that the discussion of
divisive issues tends to polarize positions and entail features of populist discourse
(Salgado 2015). Following Jagers and Walgrave (2007) conceptualization of
populism as a political communication style, this study relies methodologically on
content analysis to look at the discourse of different types of actors and examine
news and discussions on issues that are often related to populism, such as
immigration and corruption. The overall objective is to determine how immune
Portuguese politics and society are to the recent surge of populism in Europe.
Portuguese politics at the fringes of populism
The recent surges of populism in southern Europe have emerged mainly as a
response to economic and political decline (see also Salgado and Stavrakakis 2018).
The adverse economic and financial situation with the Euro Crisis and the growingly
strained relationships between some EU member countries, caused by imbalances in
decision-making at the European level, have exposed the imperfect nature of the
European integration processes and some of Eurozone’s structural problems (Picard
2015; Salgado and Nienstedt 2016). While in some cases the political and economic
weaknesses have been a key element in populist arguments against the ‘‘establish-
ment’’ (national and EU political and economic elites), in other cases they have
furthered discourses against immigration and globalization. These are emotionally
appealing narratives that distort information about facts and issues and tend to
bipolarize discussions and positions; important contextual information is also
usually disregarded in order to serve specific purposes (polarize society, magnify
and inflame discontents, engender protest and mobilization, etc.).
The emergence of populist discourses and actors in Europe can also be framed
within the crisis of the European model of social democracy, especially in countries
with increasingly aged populations (according to the 2015 United Nations report,
Portugal is one of the ten most ageing countries in the world), because of the long-
term unsustainability of generous welfare benefits. Scarcity of resources inevitably
limits those who are covered by benefits, which in turn weakens social cohesion and
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causes popular unrest and conflict, and populist discourses are often successful in
combining and magnifying discontent and reactions against the status quo (for an
empirical analysis of the link between welfare benefits and support for radical right-
wing populism, see Swank and Betz 2003, and for a more recent approach, see also
Inglehart and Norris 2016).
Facing the 2011 bailout, the weight of austerity, and a climate of political crisis,
the Portuguese political system was, however, able to adjust itself through inner
changes, countering the emergence of successful anti-system populist parties. A
good example was the political parties’ reaction to the 2015 election results and the
parliamentary left coalition built to support a Socialist Party (PS) government and
prevent the incumbent conservative coalition [PSD (Social Democratic Party)/CDS-
PP] from taking office. The PSD/CDS-PP coalition won the election, but without
absolute majority, which, given the parliament’s new configuration after the election
(the remaining political parties were all centre left or left wing oriented), made it
impossible for the coalition to forge a parliamentary majority to support its
government. This was the first time that PCP (Communist Party), PEV (Green
Party), and BE (Left Bloc) jointly supported the socialists in a durable agreement
which allowed the formation of a socialist (PS) government with the objective of
preventing a second PSD/CDS-PP coalition government (the former ruled from
2011 to 2015).
Both right and left populist political parties and leaders have not been as
successful in Portugal as in other countries in Europe, including in Southern Europe.
The election results of the National Renovator Party (PNR, a political party that is
inspired by the French Front National) have been negligible since its emergence in
2000 (0.5% in the 2015 election), and occasionally, political leaders with a more
populist style of communication emerge, but usually they are unsuccessful in
convincing voters or end up adjusting their discourse to the established system after
being elected. This was the case of Paulo Portas, the Democratic and Social Centre-
People’s Party (CDS-PP) former leader, who in the 1990s was anti-immigration, and
sceptical of the European Union, but changed substantially the discourse after
joining a coalition government in 2002. A more recent case is Marinho e Pinto.
Before being elected to the European Parliament in 2014, Marinho e Pinto’s
political discourse was full of populist features: it was against the ‘‘establishment’’
and included anti-elite and ‘‘us’’ versus ‘‘them’’ arguments. However, in the 2015
general election his new party PDR (Democratic Republican Party) was only able to
secure 1,14% of the votes. Also without major repercussions were the social
movements Geração à Rasca (Struggling Generation) and the 12th March
Movement (M12M) that emerged in the beginning of 2011, but did not evolve
into alternative political parties, as it happened in Greece and Spain (Salgado and
Zúquete 2017; for an analysis of social mobilization in Portugal in this period, see,
for example, Estanque et al. 2013).
Portugal’s recent history and more specifically the inheritance of a long period of
dictatorship (1933–1974) also contributes to explain the absence of successful
extremist parties. Not only this kind of political organizations is stigmatized, but the
Constitution also establishes as a limit to freedom of association all kinds of fascist
(and racist) organizations (article 46). The influence of the recent past is furthermore
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extended to the failure of anti-system discourses: culturally, voters have been (at
least, so far) less prone to support unestablished parties and unknown political
leaders, because of the uncertain consequences of such political choices. Nonethe-
less, the growing criticisms of the EU’s decision-making processes and of the
overall opaqueness of EU bureaucracy may urge some voters to support the strands
of populism that call for a regeneration of democracy and a better representation of
the citizens’ interests, as it happened in Spain with Podemos, for example (see
Iglesias 2015; for a general overview of challenger parties in Europe, see Hobolt
and Tilley 2016).
Despite the presence of the very same elements found in countries where populist
actors have been receiving more support (for further detail on Greece, Spain, and
Italy, see in this symposium Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2018; Kioupkiolis and
Seoane Pérez 2018; Bobba 2018, respectively), different kinds of constraints have,
thus, made it particularly difficult for populist actors to thrive in Portugal. Portugal
was one of the countries that most felt the Euro Crisis, and it has also experienced a
crisis in the legitimacy of political elites and a climate of distrust against politicians
in general, and, although less pronounced, the weakening of centrist political parties
that has been happening in other countries (e.g. Spain, Greece, France) also
happened in Portugal. But nevertheless, it was not a fertile ground for populism.
Portuguese media and populism
The negative connotation that populism has in Portuguese politics is also found in
the media (Salgado and Zúquete 2017). Not only it is common to see politicians
labelling opponents or their proposals as populist (in the sense of having
electioneering goals or being over-simplistic) to delegitimize them, but it is also
usual to find the words ‘‘populist’’ or ‘‘populism’’ when commentators and
journalists intend to criticize someone or something (e.g. a style of political
communication, a political proposal, or a policy orientation). Furthermore, in
opinion pieces, populism is often ‘‘equated with simple-mindedness, lack of
sophistication, and an overly emotional and moralistic approach to politics’’
(Salgado and Zúquete 2017: 242).
Although there is no systematic longitudinal research to empirically support
inferences of prevalence or absence of populism in Portuguese media outlets,
regarding both the coverage of the few populist actors and the use of populist frames
in news coverage in general, some evidence suggests the negligibility of such
features in the most important news media outlets. ‘‘For the most part, Portuguese
media, particularly quality newspapers and mainstream television channels, are
hostile toward manifestations of political populism and try to critically deconstruct
it’’ (Salgado and Zúquete 2017: 242). For example, extreme right-wing actors have,
on different occasions, expressed difficulties in getting their events and messages
covered by mainstream media. And Marchi noted that PNR’s scarce media coverage
has usually a negative tone; PNR is depicted as ‘‘an extremist group nostalgic for the
former authoritarian regime’’ (2013: 150).
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Despite the resistance of Portuguese media to populism, it should be noted that
media populism in the sense that Mazzoleni described, which points to a link
between media populism and popular culture and to a media’s market-driven
alignment—even if acknowledging ‘‘different degrees of responsiveness to popular
tastes and demands’’ (2003: 8)—is as present in Portugal as in other European
countries through tabloid newspapers, talk radio, infotainment television, etc.;
however, this definition has a connotation of populism that is directly linked to the
notion of popular culture, as well as to the inner character of mass media (Mazzoleni
2014), in the sense of pleasing audiences (e.g. formats such as soft news or
docudrama series, for instance). Furthermore, although strategies may have varied
through time, media outlets have always tried to capture the public’s attention, and
in line with this approach, they tend to personalize coverage, dramatize events, and
simplify complex issues, just as populist actors, who also use simple language and
tend to emotionalize and dramatize discourses (see, for example, Beppe Grillo in
Italy, or Marinho e Pinto in Portugal).
Krämer proposes a different conceptualization of media populism, in the sense
that to be considered populist, media outlets need to display specific ideological and
stylistic elements, such as ‘‘construction and favouritism of in-groups, hostility
toward, and circumvention of the elites and institutions of representative democ-
racy, reliance on charisma and common sense, and appeal to moral sentiments’’
(2014: 48). This means that, depending on their characteristics, media outlets may
or may not be fertile ground to populist actors and discourses.
The stance adopted by the media towards populist actors is particularly important
given that the success of any political actor is at least in part media driven (Altheide
and Snow 1979; Mazzoleni 2003; Stanyer et al. 2017). But these phenomena are not
straightforward: in some cases, the lack of media exposure or a negative media bias
may contribute to political failure, but in other cases, it may be precisely the
exclusion from mainstream media or a negative coverage that forces the use of
alternative media (e.g. social media) that has advantages, namely allowing to
establish direct communication channels with citizens, while bypassing mainstream
media formats, which helps in building an image of ‘‘alternative’’, more appealing
at the eyes of some dissatisfied voters; prime examples of this strategy include the
use of Twitter by Donald Trump (see, for example, Ott 2017) and the use of social
media by Beppe Grillo (see, for example, Mosca 2014).
In Portugal, mainstream politicians and journalists maintain close ties, and since
there is not much investigative journalism, journalists overly rely on politicians as
sources of information (Mesquita 2003). Overall, the media agenda is determined by
a mix of what journalists believe is the audience demand and news values, but also
by the political agenda and partisan political pressures (Salgado 2007, 2018). The
government, the president, and the parties with the most votes have a stronger
negotiating power with the media and usually have more media coverage (Salgado
2007), which means that they are strong influences on how issues and political
developments are framed and interpreted. It is common to see journalists accepting
invitations to work in politics, and many mainstream politicians as regular
commentators in media outlets. It was, for example, the case of President Marcelo
Rebelo de Sousa, who became well known to the public due to his regular
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commentaries in prime-time media since the 1990s (Salgado 2018). As a result,
mainstream journalists are often perceived as belonging to the elite and to the
establishment.
Despite of these close links, news outlets do not express directly their party
preferences (a noteworthy exception was the support of newspaper Correio da
Manhã to a candidate in a municipal election) and their ownership is independent
from political parties. Specific media legislation was prepared in the aftermath of
the 1974 revolution to ensure media independence, but it is also part of a
commercial strategy by news outlets to not drive readers/viewers away. However, it
is not uncommon to detect partisan bias in news content through the salience
attributed to certain issues, events and actors; the commentators selected to
contextualize and interpret the news, and in some opinion articles. All this
potentially affects the public’s political perceptions and knowledge.
Features of populist style and discourses: the methodological approach
The present study of the presence of populist features in online environments is not
restricted to extreme right-wing parties, because left-wing and mainstream parties,
as well as other kinds of actors, may also display populist elements in their
communication; it therefore includes the political parties with parliamentary
representation (Social Democratic Party—PSD; Socialist Party—PS; Democratic
and Social Centre-People’s Party—CDS-PP; Left Bloc—BE; Communist Party—
PCP; Green Party—PEV), plus the populist PNR (National Renovator Party) and
PDR (Democratic Republican Party). Furthermore, some issues, such as immigra-
tion, corruption, and other contentious issues, are particularly prone to populist
political communication by different political actors. Immigration is one of the most
important issues on the agenda of extreme right populist political actors (see, for
example, Walgrave and de Swert 2004; Bos and van der Brug 2010), whereas
corruption lays at the foundation of any basic populist argument, the ‘‘pure people’’
against the ‘‘corrupt elite’’ (e.g. Mudde 2004), and is often used by both right- and
left-wing populist political actors.
In addition to their relevance to populist discourses, the issues of immigration
and corruption have also a considerable agenda salience. Due to the refugee crisis
and the discussion behind Brexit, there has been an ongoing debate on immigration.
Corruption has also been very present in the agenda, because of the arrest and
criminal investigation of former prime minister José Sócrates; the recent scandals
involving some secretaries of state, which relaunched the debate on the close
relationship between the political elite and corporate interests in Portugal; the
‘‘Lava-Jato’’ scandal in Brazil involving former president Lula da Silva and the
removal of president Dilma Roussef; the situation of widespread corruption in
Angola and the Angolan political elite alleged strategy of money laundering by
buying assets in Portugal; the corruption scandals within the Spanish People’s Party
(PP); or the Panama papers investigation, just to give a few examples.
Following Jagers and Walgrave (2007) proposal that defines populism primarily
as a political communication style and because we can find populism in different
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ideologies and in different types of political parties (right, centre, left, mainstream,
fringe) as well as in other actors, this analysis is focused on political information
and communication and not on political ideology. Specifically, it studies online
news and comments from newspapers’ websites, and Facebook posts by political
parties on issues associated with populism, immigration and corruption, through
content analysis.
Regardless of political leaning and ideology, populist discourses and styles entail
distinctive elements. A common consensus view on populism is the idea that it
equates ‘‘the people’’ with ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘the elites’’ with ‘‘evil’’, in the sense of a
Manichean worldview (Mudde 2004). Naturally, the nature and composition of the
people and the elite varies according to ideology: in right-wing populism, the notion
of ‘‘the people’’ is directly related to a nationalist view and refers to native-born
citizens, and it thus excludes foreigners and immigrants from the people; in left-
wing populism, ‘‘the people’’ is broader, encompassing all those who are not part of
the elite. But, whereas the interpretations of the people differ, these views entail a
notion of the people as a constructed entity: a homogenous group without legitimate
divisions and notable differences in interests. However, a distinction between elite
and people is hardly populism-related only. According to Jagers and Walgrave, for
political communication to be considered populist, it ‘‘always refers to the people
and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people; is rooted in
anti-elite feelings; and considers the people as a monolithic group without internal
differences except for some specific categories’’ that are excluded (2007: 322).
Populism is also related to other important elements: it often entails direct political
communication strategies, through both the choice of means of communication and
the use of specific stylistic options in the political discourse. But it is important to
stress, as Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) do, that it is not clear which features of
populism are constitutive elements or empirical consequences of populism.
Given that the present study is based on an exploratory approach aimed at
detecting traces of populism in different online environments, it includes three
different types of units of analysis, namely news items on immigration and
corruption that were published in three daily newspapers with online presence: two
reference newspapers, a centre-left (Público) and a centre-right (Observador), and a
tabloid paper (Correio da Manhã). Extant literature (Mazzoleni 2003) suggests that
when compared with reference newspapers, tabloid papers display higher degrees of
populism in their news coverage, due to a more popular approach not only in
language and visuals, but also in the selection and presentation of news (e.g. crimes,
use of emotions and drama).
The analysis also includes two types of unmediated online content: the readers’
comments to the selected news stories and posts published by political parties on
their Facebook pages. Two main reasons justify the inclusion of the readers’ online
comments: first, although they may not be fully representative of public opinion,
they are written by common citizens and are therefore expressions of ‘‘the people’’
which are populist by nature; second, it is relevant to juxtapose the citizens’ views
on these issues with news items and parties’ messages. Moreover, comments to
news were included instead of parties’ Facebook comments because they are
expected to cover a broader variety of political preferences.
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Finally, the political parties’ posts on Facebook that focused on immigration and
corruption were also included. Because ‘‘populism is not necessarily the prerogative
of populist parties’’ (Rooduijn et al. 2014; Stanyer et al. 2017), several political
parties were analysed: the parties with parliamentary representation (PS, PSD, CDS-
PP, BE, PCP, and PEV), and the extreme right PNR. PDR, a recent party whose
leader (Marinho e Pinto) has been considered populist, could not be included
because it did not have an updated Facebook page.
This assorted sample allows comparing user-generated content published by
politicians with news content filtered by gatekeepers and the online readers’
comments, which are published freely but under some constraints imposed by news
media outlets. Today, reading a news story online also means paying attention to the
readers’ comments, which can potentially influence opinions. This is all the more
important if, as Groshek and Engelbert, we consider ‘‘political populism and online
media uses as two interdependent trends that are central features in rapidly evolving
socio-political landscapes’’ (2013: 184).
The coding units are thus the individual news items, online readers’ comments,
and parties’ posts. The operationalization of populism in the content analysis
follows Jagers and Walgrave (2007) conceptualization, which refers to three
elements: references to the people in the sense of expressions of closeness to the
people, belonging to the people, speaking on behalf of the people (forms of people
centrism); anti-elitism (elites, establishment, system, mainstream politics and
parties); exclusion of out-groups (immigrants and other minorities). These three
elements were coded using a dichotomous scale referring to their absence or
presence (no—0; yes—1) in the coding units.
Examples such as the following were included as references to the people and
people centrism: ‘‘We are part of the people, our party is not a party of ‘caudilhos’
(the term refers to authoritarian political-military leaders) as the others’’; ‘‘the
people can dismiss everyone who does not agree and does not protect the interests of
the people’’. Sentences such as ‘‘the ones who betray the people versus the serious
people’’, ‘‘we the people against the powerful’’, or ‘‘we are not of the same ilk as
them’’ were coded as containing elements of anti-elitism. Finally, statements
expressing antagonism towards out-groups were also coded as indicating the
presence of characteristics of populist discourse. The out-groups that were
considered included immigrants in general; specific nationalities of immigrants,
as Brazilians, Cape Verdeans, East Europeans, etc.; religious groups, as the
Muslims; racial and ethnic groups, as the Roma community or black people; or
specific political groups, which commonly referred to the political parties that have
ruled the country since the 1974 democratic revolution. Blame shifting, scapegoat-
ing, and the use of simplistic dichotomies, as ‘‘good and bad’’, are other features of
populist discourses and strategies used to oversimplify issues, but these were not
systematically coded on this occasion.
In addition to identifying which—if any—features of populism are used, in
which media, and by whom, that is, which actors are more prone to populist
approaches to issues, this sample also allows testing whether mainstream media
stigmatize populist actors and messages. The mainstream media resistance to—at
least some forms of—populism (Marchi 2013; Salgado and Zúquete 2017) increases
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the interest in the analysis of social media, because they ensure direct communi-
cation channels with citizens that bypass the mainstream media gatekeepers. The
approach thus examines whether online unmediated media environments are
somehow contributing to convey and legitimize populist discourses and styles.
The prevalence of populist features of discourse in online media
The data were collected from 1 May to 31 July 2016 for news items and readers’
comments and from 1 February to 31 July 2016 for parties’ Facebook posts. The
difference in the dates is explained by the scarcity of Facebook posts; most political
parties in Portugal do not update their Facebook pages frequently, and the issues of
corruption and immigration were not addressed frequently by most of them (PSD,
CDS-PP, and PCP do not have any posts on these issues in the selected period). All
in all, small parties (BE, PNR, and to a lesser extent PEV) use Facebook much
more, but except for PNR, immigration and corruption are not preferred topics. To
overcome the overall shortage of political parties’ messages, the direct quotes of
party members in news items were also coded.
The final sample consists of 336 news items on immigration and 583 on
corruption (news items with the words ‘‘immigration’’ and ‘‘corruption’’, but not
actually dealing with the issues were excluded), of which 15% contained quotes
from political parties; 402 readers’ comments (many news items did not have any
readers’ comments available, especially in Correio da Manhã); and 110 Facebook
posts. Two researchers coded the three types of coding units (news items, comments
to news, and Facebook posts) and the intercoder reliability test that was performed
included approximately 10% of each of the coding units’ samples and produced
satisfactory results (Krippendorff’s alpha[ .71).
A first noteworthy conclusion is that corruption wasmore salient than immigration.
Not that immigration is not on the agenda, but it motivated fewer messages from
politicians (except from PNR) and from citizens, as well as less news coverage. It is,
however, the immigration issue that is most linked to populism in the news and
comments, which might be explained by international news coverage and by the
visibility of issues such as the rise of right-wing, anti-immigration parties in several
European countries, the refugee crisis, or Trump’s discourse against immigration.
The content analysis findings show that populism is not prevalent in Portuguese
media and politics. The tabloid Correio da Manhã has a simpler language style (as
well as wider headlines and more visuals), and the prevalence of elements of
populism in its news items was slightly higher (8%) when compared to Observador
(6%) and much higher than Público (2.9%). It is important to note that, in
newspapers, populist discourse was more common in opinion articles.
The most recurrent features of populism in the news coverage were references to
the people (e.g. the expression ‘‘Zé Povinho’’, which means precisely ‘‘the people’’
in Portuguese) and criticism of the elites, being the discourse anti-elites particularly
featured in news items on corruption (e.g. ‘‘It is not about left or right, it is the tragic
nature of politics’’, Eduardo Dâmaso, in CM, June 29; ‘‘The fall of the Europe of the
elites’’, Teixeira Fernandes, in Público, June 24). Most opinion articles with
Where’s populism? Online media and the diffusion…
populist features were focused on the issue of corruption, and it was mainly the anti-
elitism feature of populism that prevailed, which can be explained by the amount of
corruption scandals involving the political elites and the richest both nationally and
internationally and by the fact that both mainstream politicians and journalists
display favourable views towards immigration.
Regarding the quotes from politicians in the news coverage, it is important to note
that populism was not common and that PNR is practically absent from mainstream
media coverage. Overall, accusations and blame shifting, and the use of the word
‘‘people’’ are present in all parties’ discourses, but these in itself are not sufficient to
consider their discourses as populist, because their statements did not: (1) denote an
anti-establishment view; (2) deny the legitimacy of political opponents; and (3) or
contest the existence and legitimacy of different groups and interests within ‘‘the
people’’. Furthermore, a populist-style separation between the ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ was
also not significant in the discourse of most political parties. This distinction is,
however, pronounced in the readers’ online comments, especially in corruption-
related comments; these citizens do not feel their interests are being properly
represented and many see politicians as self-serving, deceptive, and corrupt.
Right-wing populist discourses focusing on anti-immigration and exclusion of out-
groups are practically absent in politics, except for the extreme right PNR’s Facebook
page. But they are present in readers’ comments. These are spaces for citizens to
intervene in public debates and where they interact with journalists and with each
other, which therefore allow getting information about some of the citizens’ reactions
to news and issues. For example, the capacity of the frail Portuguese economy to
support the coming ofmore immigrants and refugees is often questioned in comments,
which also include expressions of fear and distrust against Muslims, related to the
terrorist attacks and sexual assaults of women in Europe, especially in the readers of
Observador (CMwebsite did not have almost any readers’ comments available). Some
of these opinions were for instance: ‘‘It is naive to think that refugees change their
beliefs when they come to Europe. They are bringing the behaviors and ideas that have
made their countries a living hell’’; ‘‘IfMerkel wants refugees, she can keep them all in
Germany’’. It is not possible to measure the representativeness of such comments, but
it is interesting to note that the political and media elites have not voiced or addressed
these citizens’ angst and concerns.
The PNR Facebook page is flooded by this type of comments, as well as by other
features of populism: ‘‘This mass immigration is an invasion. It is a menace to
Portuguese identity, sovereignty, safety and future survival. We cannot accept any
financial support to immigrants, when so many of us have so little. This immigration
policy leads to the deterioration of salaries, rising crime and the dilution of our
national identity’’; ‘‘European workers are fed up, they are victims of the
politicians’ mistakes and the immigration lobby that wants cheap labour only to
increase profit’’. The issue of corruption is also extremely important; it is used by
PNR as a justification to claim for a major political reform. But PNR is the
exception; the remaining political parties’ online messages had very few references
to any of the main elements of populism, and the most recurrent was the simple
reference to the people, being ‘‘the people’’ mostly equated to the ‘‘country’s
population’’, ‘‘working class’’, and ‘‘common citizens’’.
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Conclusion
Different factors may trigger populism. Populism may be part of a country’s
political culture (Urbinati 2013); an integral component of representative politics
(Taggart 2004), or a reflection of its limitations (Canovan 1999). But it can be
caused by economic crises and unfair economic redistribution (e.g. Laycock 2005;
Kriesi 2014), a perceived rise of corruption and moral decay (Fieschi and Heywood
2004; Taggart 2004), or political crises (Taggart 2004; Kriesi 2014), which often
lead to distrust in the democratic representative system.
Portugal has experienced most of these situations, but has been resilient to
populism. With the exception of the election of Marinho e Pinto for the European
Parliament, the electoral success of populists in Portugal has been rather negligible
and mainstream media usually counter populism. There is, however, very limited
information about the presence of populist discourses and styles of communication
in public debates. This exploratory approach intended to capture the prevalence of
populist features in discussions about issues, by examining different types of media,
and mediated and unmediated messages focused on immigration and corruption.
Overall, the content analysis showed that in Portugal populist discourses and styles
were more common in citizens’ comments and particularly in the extreme right-
wing PNR’s Facebook page, but overall they were not recurrent.
The connections between mainstream media and mainstream politics are very
close, and mainstream media are deemed to be part of the ‘‘establishment’’ in
Portugal. This also explains why their permeability to populism has been quite
limited. The newness of some discourses might attract coverage for some time, but
mainstream media tend to disregard or be very critical of arguments that focus on
structural reforms of the political system (see also Mendes 2005) and especially of
right-wing extremist parties. In the case of this sample, if it were not for social
media (Facebook) and the spaces for readers’ comments, the visibility of populism
would be almost inexistent. Alternative online media have thus allowed the
introduction and dissemination of populist views on issues and of populist styles of
communication in the public debate. They can, therefore, pose a challenge for
mainstream media, not only in terms of formats, but also of content, while
mainstream political parties may need to readjust their agendas and discourses.
Somehow, this research also provides evidence that changes in the media are closely
linked to political and social changes.
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